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THE LAW AND LATE MODERN CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
CRITICAL CULTURAL LEGAL STUDIES
ROSEMARY J. COOMBE' WITH JONATHAN COHEN**

It would be impossible to do justice to as large and as ambitious a
work as Between Facts and Norms'-nevertheless the entirety of Professor Habermas's theoretical edifice-in the space available here. Our interlocution in this symposium will address some of the central themes in
Habermas's work from a particular corner of the legal academy--one
that has not, as yet, been fully engaged in the rich dialogue that Habermas's work (and Habermas himself) invites. Others have suggested that
Habermas overstates the pervasive and integrative nature of law.2 Given
the positivist3 and formaliste conceptualization of law that dominates his
work, this objection is well-founded. However, the insights, research and
investigations of the Legal Realists, legal historians, legal sociologists,
and legal anthropologists (whose collective enterprise we,will deem a
critical cultural studies of law)' suggest another alternative. This scholar-

* B.A. (Hons), LL.B. (Dist) University of Western Ontario, J.S.M., J.S.D. Stanford
University. Professor of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law.
** B.A. cum laude (Yale), M. Phil. (Cambridge). Student at the University of Toronto
Faculty of Law.
1. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMs: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
*2. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The View of Habermas From Below: Doubts About the Centrality
of Law and the Legitimation Enterprise,76 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 (1999).

3. Arthur Jacobson describes Habermas's position as one of "Itihe most rigorous positivism"
because, like other positivist forms of static jurisprudence, the source of law is an authoritative
procedure and law is whatever those who get hold of the procedure mark as law using the procedure.
See Arthur J. Jacobson, Law and Order, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
EXCHANGES 190, 191-92 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998). His model is "rigorous" it
would seem, because it "gives control of the procedure to a political sphere" outside of and differentiated from the legal system. Id. at 192. Mark Modak-Truran, however, believes that Habermas goes
beyond positivism by asking what provides the procedure by which "law is legitimated by its legality or by positive enactment according to certain formal procedures," with their legitimating force?
The answer is "the procedure of coming to a rational intersubjective agreement." Mark ModakTruran, Habermas'sDiscourse Theory of Law and the RelationshipBetween Law and Religion, 26
CAP. U. L. REv. 461, 475 (1997). To the extent that law is still limited to its positive enactment,
however, the position is stiil a positivist one.
4. As Jacques Lenoble puts it, "If the Habermasian model makes up for a lot of inadequacies
of the Luhmannian functionalist model, it fails to move beyond formalism and remains bound to the
classical idealization of human reason." Jacques Lenoble, Law and Undecidability: Toward a New
Vision of the Proceduralizationof Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at

40.
5. Rosemary Coombe has explored the premises and parameters of this area of sociolegal
research in a recent book and in two recent articles. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL
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ship indicates that law plays a more powerful role in shaping those activities we consider "political" than Habermas himself acknowledges and
explores the historically contingent and contested location of the
law/politics distinction he seems to take for granted. From the perspective of a critical cultural studies of law, law appears to be simultaneously
more pervasive but far less integrative than Between Facts and Norms
would have us believe.
The critical cultural study of law complicates the systems/lifeworld
distinction upon which Habermas's conception of law-if not his entire
theoretical edifice-rests and does so by challenging some of the central
categorical distinctions of the liberal legalism that Habermas takes for
granted. We will develop each of the following points in turn. First, the
law may shape and provide the very substance of lifeworlds as well as
the symbolic resources with which aspirations for social transformations
are articulated and specific cultural meanings are, through practices of
adjudication, routinely legitimated and given the force of law. Thus, even
for heuristic purposes, the interaction between law and culture cannot be
adequately understood in terms of a relationship between an independent
system and meaningful lifeworld as discrete spaces. Second, the law creates and upholds the very public/private distinction Habermas assumes
and provides forums in which social struggles over such characterizations are enacted. Rather than separating itself from the market, the law
creates markets by recognizing "private" properties; it also constrains the
development of democratic cultures of deliberation by excusing holders
of private properties from public accountability for the political effects of
their exercise of ownership. Third, a far wider range of expressive activities would appear to have "political" consequence than the narrow
range of communications characterized by rational argumentation. In
contexts of social pluralism, confining political speech this narrowly may
reinforce systemic forms of exclusion. Fourth, capitalist mass communications systems provide not only the means, but the media for many
kinds of expressive persuasion which call the social into account by
calling it into question and which might therefore be considered political.
Mass media provides many of the cultural forms with which communities, identities, and social aspirations are articulated in contemporary
democratic societies: a theory that insists upon maintaining strict divisions between politics and the lifeworld and isolating both from market
forces and commodity relations cannot acknowledge let alone accommodate these expressive practices. Finally, intellectual property laws will be
drawn upon by way of example. Such laws serve to commodify mass

LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998) [hereinafter COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE]; Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical
Cultural Studies of Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.

Kearns eds., 1998) [hereinafter Coombe, Contingent Articulations]; Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical
CulturalLegal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463 (1998).
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media circulated forms as private properties, protect corporate investment in such texts, control their reproduction and circulation, and prohibit subaltern practices of media appropriation that would speak alternative truths to dominant powers. In conclusion, we will suggest that
given the inherent instability of the social and its inability to fully grasp
itself as a positivity, as well as the indeterminacy of language, a radical

democracy cannot predefine a realm of properly political activity, but
must be vigilant in providing protection to emerging forms of human
expression whose political characteristics cannot immediately be comprehended.
These arguments pose serious social challenges to Habermas's
characterization of law as the autonomous intermediary that neutrally
transmits lifeworld energies into political expressions that speak local
truths to central administrative powers. A critical cultural legal studies
reveals that the law is fully imbricated in shaping lifeworld activities,
bestowing proprietary powers, creating markets, establishing forms of
cultural authority, constraining speech, and policing the public/private
distinction that protects corporate authors from social accountability. The
very marrow of contemporary political practice may be found in expressive activities that call the social into question and into account by confronting it with the contingency of its current boundaries. In worlds as
textually mediated as those of late modern capitalist democracies, forms
of political persuasion that call the social into question are likely to take
a variety of expressive forms-including humor, parody, satire, and
emotional narratives. Rather than predefining a range of activities as
political-and limiting the space of the political to rational argumentation-a truly dialogic democratic politics must consider those practices
that address, comment upon, and transform the meaning of dominant
cultural texts. Any understanding of the political that cannot encompass
such practices-and address the role of law in shaping, regulating, and
constraining them---can provide only an impoverished vision of dialogic
democracy and the role of law in facilitating it.
I. OF LEGAL SYSTEMS AND CULTURAL LIFEWORLDS
There is little to warrant the construction of an ideal bridge to join
two autonomous realms designated as "law" and "culture." Such a construction serves only to reinforce the exhausted metaphysics of modernity which enabled their conceptual emergence as discrete and naturalized domains of social life. As Coombe (and others) have argued elsewhere, the tidy distinction between law as an autonomous system and
culture as a symbolic lifeworld emerges out of a colonial framework and
is itself the residual artifact of regimes of colonial governance.' Putting
that historical argument to one side, however, an understanding of how
the two terms-law and culture-have been reconfigured across discipli-

6.

See Coombe, Contingent Articulations, supra note 5, at 21.
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nary lines does serve to reveal the fundamental lineaments of critical
cultural legal studies.
Over the last two decades, law and society scholars have turned away
from positivist, formalist (doctrinalist or structuralist), instrumentalist,
and institutionally centered accounts of law to explore law as a more
diffuse and pervasive force shaping social consciousness and behavior.
An enormous body of literature draws upon historical records, sociological inquiry, and ethnographic research to question law's "relative autonomy."7 Concerns with law's legitimating function increasingly focus on
law's cultural role in constituting the social realities we recognize. Such
constitutive theories recognize law's productive capacities by shifting
attention to the workings of law in ever more improbable settings.8 Focusing less exclusively upon formal institutions, law and society scholarship has begun to look more closely at law in everyday life,9 in quotidian
practices of struggle, and in forms of social perception."

7. Most scholars of law and society write against law as a body of self-sufficient doctrine, or
law as an autonomous set of institutions and also reject the abstractions of structuralist analysis of
law or liberal legal discourse, even when such practices are allegedly critical, as they are in critical
legal studies and critical race theory. See generally PAUL F. CAMPOs ET AL., AGAINST THE LAW
(1996); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END (1995); CHARLES SAMPFORD, THE DISORDER OF LAW: A CRITIQUE OF LEGAL
THEORY (1989); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998); Robert W. Gordon,
CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). These might be seen as propensities to write
"against law" in the sense that these scholars are writing against the law's dominant selfrepresentations.
8. See Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a PostliberalSociety, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 89
(1993); see also ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE
THEORY OF LAW (1993); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE:
LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS INTHE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995); Sue Lees, Lawyers' Work
As Constitutive of Gender Relations, in LAWYERS INA POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND
TRANSGRESSION 124 (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1149 (1997). For a brief, introductory
discussion of the constitutive perspective, see Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great
Divide. Forms of Legal Scholarshipand Everyday Life, in LAW INEVERYDAY LIFE 21 (Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
9. See Sarat & Kearns, supra note 8; see also Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation,
and the Management of Divorce Practice,28 L. & Soc'Y REv. 149 (1994).
10. See generally PATRICK EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE at xi (1998); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETuING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); AUSTIN
SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND
MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995); THE RHETORIC OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Keams eds., 1994); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation,and Resistance: An
Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 731,731(1992); Sally E. Merry, Resistance
and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 11 (1994); Michael Musheno, Legal Consciousness on the Margins of Society: Struggles Against Stigmatization in the AIDS Crisis, 2
IDENTITIES 101 (1995); Austin Sarat, The Law Is All Over: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 343 (1990); Austin Sarat & L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L. J.
1663, 1665 (1989).
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Through historical, ethnographic and sociological inquiries, this
scholarship shows that legal discourse provides significant resources for
practices in which dominant social meanings are constructed and contested, and that the legal system provides institutional venues for struggles to establish, legitimate, and challenge authoritative meanings. In
short, the adoption of legal strategies may give meanings the force of
material enforcement. The revitalization of legal anthropology has enhanced our theoretical understandings of power and resistance." Critical
cultural studies of law recognize that law provides resources for rhetorical persuasion as well as regulation, possibility as well as prohibition,
subversion as well as sanction. From this vantage, "law becomes a form
of social mediation, a locus of social contest and construction."' 2
If law fuels hegemonic processes, it also assists counterhegemonic
struggles. When law shapes the realities we recognize, it is not surprising
that its spaces should be seized by those who would have other versions
of social relations ratified and other cultural meanings mandated. Culturally, law is explored as discourse, process, and practice--engaged in
forms of both domination and resistance.'3 Locally interpreted, law provides means and forums for legitimating and contesting dominant
meanings and the social hierarchies they support." Legal regimes shape
the social meanings assumed by signifying properties in public spheres.
Such meanings are socially produced in fields characterized by inequalities of discursive and material resources, symbolic capital, and access to
channels of communication. The law creates spaces in which hegemonic
struggles are enacted as well as providing signs and symbols whose connotations are always ever at risk. Legal strategies and legal institutions
may lend authority to certain interpretations while denying status to others.
If understandings of law have become more cultural in this comer of
the legal academy, traditional understandings of cultural lifeworlds have
been transformed by developments in anthropology and cultural studies.
Anthropologists have acknowledged the Orientalizing tendencies of
studying culture as discrete formations-shifting focus to the study of
power and meaning in everyday life. Culture has been largely reconceptualized as involving activities of expressive struggle rather than singular
symbolic contexts, socially located in conflictual signifying practices
11. See generally John L. Comaroff, Foreword to CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY
AND RESISTANCE (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch eds., 1994) (attempting to "demonstrate
that new scholarship in legal history and the anthropology of law contributes to theoretical understanding of power, hegemony, and resistance").
12. Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 L. & Soc'y
REv. 1243, 1246 (1994).
13. See Susan F. Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black, Introduction to CONTESTED STATES: LAW,
HEGEMONY & RESISTANCE 1-2 (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch eds., 1994).
14. For an extended discussion see Rosemary J. Coombe, Contesting the Self Negotiating
Subjectivities in Nineteenth-Century Ontario Defamation Trials, 11 STUD. INL. POL. & Soc'Y 3
(1991).
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rather than integrated worlds of meaning. Culture is now recognized as
both the medium and the consequence of social differences, inequalities,
dominations, and exploitations-the form of their inscription and the
means of their imbrication." In short, an entrenched skepticism towards
both law and culture as reified fields of social life-nevertheless closed
systems of rationality or protected social worlds of harmonious meaning-is the intellectual hallmark of contemporary legal anthropology,
and the related fields of sociolegal studies and critical legal theory.
A critical cultural legal studies explores the dynamic nature of juridiculture(to coin a word) as it unfolds in political processes. Habermas
himself has long been concerned with the tendency of systems to "colonize" lifeworlds. "However, the increasing evidence that lifeworlds shape
systems suggests a more dialectical relationship."7 Culture-the meaningful forms and practices of lifeworld activity-is shaped by law, but it
would be a grave misrepresentation to see this as a one way imposition.
The relationship between forms of legal power, the resistance this power
paradoxically both engenders and endangers, shaping and inviting-but
never determining-lifeworld practices which may in turn transform law
and the rights it recognizes-is both dialectic and diacritical.
Attention to the cultural dimensions of law's power suggests that law
cannot operate autonomously as a hinge that protects lifeworlds from the
incursions of the market and the state and neutrally transmits lifeworld
"signals" to administrative powers. Although Habermas seems to believe
that the lifeworld is a nonlegal form of social and behavioral regulation
that provides the cultural matrix within which identities and communities
are formed, it becomes clear, even in his own account, that the law's
intervention in the political system affects the "signals" it mediates,8 such
that "far from being neutral, the law is embedded in the lifeworld."'
A critical cultural legal studies rejects any vision of a social world in
which differences exist before the law and law is merely called upon to
resolve and lend authority to social claims generated elsewhere. Instead,

15. As Thomas McCarthy notes, Habermas's model can accommodate conflicts of interest but
is less hospitable to conflicts of value, ways of life, or worldviews. See Thomas McCarthy, Legitimacy and Diversity: DialecticalReflections on Analytical Distinctions, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND
DIEMocRAcy, supra note 3, at 115. Disagreement continues to be marginalized even as notions of
social diversity, multiculturalism, and transnationalism are incorporated into the model. See id
16. Jacques Lenoble notes that Habermas recognizes that the West has entered into a historically new phase of the extension of the role of law such that juridification no longer protects lifeworlds from system intrusions but his "proceduralization" of law "does not give us a procedural way
to call into question the inherent organizational structures of the state, or the specifically legal
mechanisms for controlling... the market and the administrative apparatus." Lenoble, supranote 4,
at 63. Hence, he characterizes Habermas as resigned to continuing colonizations. See id.
17. For a recent survey discussion and a set of ethnographic studies developing the proposition, see THE PoLmcs OF CULTURE IN THE SHADOW OF CAPITAL (Lisa Lowe & David Lloyd eds.,
1997).
18. Dick Howard, Law and PoliticalCulture, 17 CARDOZOL. REV. 1391, 1428 (1996).
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it explores the role of law and legal discourse in those signifying practices in which politically salient social distinctions and social differences
are constructed and contested-temporarily establishing and legitimating
social orders of differentiation while simultaneously providing resources
with which these orders may potentially be disrupted. A critical cultural
legal studies attends to the ways in which law provides the discursive
vehicles that give legitimacy to socially salient distinctions, adjudicating
their meanings, and shaping the very practices through which such
meanings are disrupted. Law is not simply an institutional forum or legitimating discourse to which social groups turn to have pre-existing
differences recognized, but, more crucially, a central locus for the control
and dissemination of those signifying forms with which identities and
difference are made and remade. The signifying forms around which
political action mobilizes and with which social rearticulations are accomplished, may be attractive and compelling precisely because of (the
qualities of) the powers legally bestowed upon them.
II. PUBLIC SPHERES AND PRIVATE PROPERTIES

If a critical cultural legal studies suggests that it is untenable to consider lifeworlds that exist before the law and illustrate, instead, that law
is a constitutive force in lifeworld activity, they also join the tradition of
Critical Legal Studies and Legal Realists in denying that public spheres
are socially distinguishable from private interests except to the extent
that the law legitimates and enforces such distinctions. A critical cultural
studies of law sees such distinctions not as established prior to political
activity but instead as providing sites for and stakes of political contestation.
In his early work, Habermas used the distinction between public and
private to define the boundaries of political deliberation, and was properly criticized for so doing. Such a narrowing of the public sphere could
not serve democratic interests if it implied that "private interests" and
"private issues" would be considered inappropriate topics for public discourse. The appropriate boundaries of the public sphere must be part of
any process of public negotiation, because such boundaries are never
naturally given but historically constructed and "are frequently deployed
to delegitimate some interests, views, and topics and to valorize others." 9
Boundaries exist only in contingent compromises that must be open to
the challenges of those who seek "to convince others that so-called private matters are subjects of common concern."' This, at least, is a criticism of his model that Habermas has accepted"' and largely taken into
account in Between Factsand Norms.

19. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 1, 22 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).

20.

Id. at 20.

21.

See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 306,309,314.
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Two senses of the term "private" tend to disenfranchise subordinate(d) groups-that which pertains to intimate, domestic, or sexual life
(which are especially likely to affect women and sexual minorities) and
that which pertains to the prerogatives of private property in a market
economy. By deeming such matters private, we make them off-limits to
public contestation and debate.' Habermas's reformulated discourse theory of democracy in Between Facts and Norms addresses the former
issue by accepting that topics cannot be ruled "out of order" by virtue of
some preordained status as "private issues." Respecting the "privacy" of
market allocations, however, seems to pose no particular concerns for
him, primarily because of his insistence that civil society (the social
space for political debate in public spheres) is distinct from the market
and the administrative state.'
In his early work, Habermas asserted that under the altered conditions of the late twentieth century, the bourgeois model of the public
sphere was no longer viable. Many legal theorists concerned with democracy and dialogue in contemporary capitalist conditions have also
questioned the applicability of eighteenth-century models to late twentieth-century communications conditions. They, too, doubt the propriety of
continuing to assume the communicative conditions of the bourgeois
public sphere, but unlike Habermas, who appears determined to maintain
its cartography, these scholars see its constitutive categories of differentiation as increasingly archaic:
[S]peech v. action, print v. broadcast, political v. nonpolitical. Sym-

bolic expression in its many forms... blurs the speech/action cleavage; new forms of technology.., confuse courts in applying the
print/broadcast distinction; arguments over what is and is not political
speech have no resolution .... 24

22. See George Yudice, Civil Society, Consumption, and Governmentality in an Age of Global
Restructuring: An Introduction, 14 Soc. TExT. 1, 22 (1995).
23. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 299. In this view, each sphere-the public sphere, the
economic sphere, and the sphere of public administration-rather neatly has its own mechanism of
social integration. Just as administrative power is the coordinating force in public administration (a
rather tautological proposition), money is the coordinating motor of the economic system (a reductionist position which discounts the various social conventions and cultural belief systems which
enable markets to function), and language is the medium that integrates the public spheres that
comprise civil society. Although Habermas would seem to acknowledge that ordinary language
communications can be distorted, he provides no mechanisms for avoiding this danger. In none of
these spheres are possibilities for aggregations of wealth or concentrations of power adequately
attended to.
24. Robert Trager, Entangled Values: The First Amendment in the 1990s, 45 J. CoMM. 163,
169 (1995). Garnham makes a significant point about the shortcomings of the liberal model in contemporary conditions:
While the rights of free expression inherent in democratic theory have been continually
stressed, what has been lost is any sense of the reciprocal duties inherent in a communicative space that is physically shared .... the social obligations that participation in the
public sphere involves .... duties to listen to others.. . , to alternative versions of events
.... to take responsibility for the effects of actions that may result from that debate ....
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Some critics of liberal legalism (from which Habermas has not fully
divorced himself) complain that it continues to take communication by
print as its model and aspiration. A relation between an individual intentional author and a rationally deliberating reader serves as the paradigm
for the production and reception of communicative forms. Others, like
legal philosopher Owen Fiss see the central rhetorical figure to be the
individual "street comer speaker" who requires protection against state
censorship-an increasingly anachronistic (although not wholly irrelevant) configuration in contemporary conditions.' In either case, justifications for constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expression cling
tenaciously to Enlightenment concepts and bourgeois ideals despite fundamental transformations in the nature of contemporary communications.
As Fiss asserted over a decade ago, the American constitutional tradition
of freedom of expression is unable to effectively grasp the salient characteristics or challenges of capitalist mass-communications systems.'
In an era in which media conglomerates dominate communications,
threats to the autonomy of speech and to public debate are just as
likely-if not more likely-to be posed by so-called private actors than
by the state. In the United States, for example, freedom of speech doctrine routinely confronts conflicts between economic and political liberties framed as competing rights.2' Rights to political speech are often
posed against rights to enjoy the prerogatives of private property (and in
many jurisdictions both rights are constitutionally protected for corporations as well as persons pursuant to the fiction of the corporation as a

A crucial effect of mediated communication in a context of mediated social relations is to
divorce discourse from action and thus favour irresponsible communication.
Nicholas Garnham, The Mass Media, Cultural Identity, and the Public Sphere in the Modern
World, 5 PuB. CULTURE 251, 261 (1993).
25. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986)
[hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech]; see also Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L. J.
1613, 1613-14 (1995). For an extensive discussion of the ways in which freedom of expression
jurisprudence ignores fundamental facets of communication in late-twentieth-century contexts and
dominant principles of protection are at odds with the realities of a mass-mediated "amusementcentered culture," see RONALD K. L. COLLINs & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE
(1996).
26. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 1414-15.
27. Habermas does not address the numerous critiques leveled against "rights-discourse" and
the defenses this critique has provoked. Lenoble correctly points to 'the fundamental instability of
all adjudication between competing rights. An individual right can only be established in relation to
the rights of others, and therefore remains tied to the undecidability that permeates all communicative action." Lenoble, supra note 4, at 71. Similarly, McCarthy reminds us that
the system of basic rights does not exist in a state of transcendental purity, but only in the
interpretations of it embodied in actually existing democratic constitutional traditions....
[T]hese interpretations are multiple, various, and context-dependent .... [T]here is significant basis for reasonable disagreement ....[N]ot only the correct interpretation but
also the proper balancing of different components of existing systems of rights will be
subject to reasonable dispute.
McCarthy, supra note 15, at 132.
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legal individual). As Fiss and others recognize, the property owner's "No
Trespassing" sign generally prevails.'

Mass media, electronic telecommunications, instantaneous communications, and the corporate restructuring and commodification of urban
space have made street comers and their speakers invisible, inaudible,
and obsolete as forums and agents of political dialogue. More of the texts
we encounter in everyday life are the products of corporate marketing
departments than the creations of individual authors, and images beamed
at us via fiber optic cables are more ubiquitous than rhetorical oratory
mediated through human vocal chords. It is doubtful that protecting an
individual's autonomy to speak will guarantee rich public debate when
the forums for speaking and the circuits of communication are privately
owned, and when those who control them have an inordinate capacity to
influence the terms of debate." In conditions of scarcity of access, the
protection of a certain agent's autonomy to speak may well impoverish
public debate to the extent that opportunities for effective communication are limited. Communications markets may ensure only that the
views of those who are economically powerful will be heard in public
debates."
Critics of liberal free speech doctrine find that it is built upon untenable distinctions between private property and public speech in an era
when so many forms of public speech require the use of private proper-

ties. Most contemporary constitutional theorists now appear to agree that
some form of regulation of mass media is necessary to achieve democratic political goals," given that mass communications controlled by

28. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 1407. For a discussion of free speech under the
First Amendment, its history, and various interpretations, see PAUL CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH:
DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN LIBERTY 123-48 (1988); DAVID KAIRYS, Wmi LIBERTY AND
JUSTICE FOR SOME: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT 39-82 (1993); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); C. Edwin Baker, Advertising
and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2097 (1992); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism. Legal Realist Approaches to the FirstAmendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Casefor JudicialReview, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (1993);
Mary E. Becker, The Politicsof Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1992); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture. Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1258 (1992); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (1988); Allan C.
Hutchinson, Talking the Good Life. From Free Speech to Democratic Dialogue, I YALE J.L & LIB.
17 (1989); Frederick Schauer, The PoliticalIncidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 935 (1993); Steven Shiffrin, The Politicsof the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle,69
IND. L.J. 689 (1994); Steven L. Winter, FastFood and False Friendsin the Shopping Mall of Ideas,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 965 (1993).
29. Cf. Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 1410-11; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARv. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987), reprinted in OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERAUSM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND THE MANYUSES OF STATE POWER (1996).
30. See Fiss, FreeSpeech, supra note 25, at 1413.
31. Cf., e.g., THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds.,
1992). For an overview of recent scholarship, see Trager, supra note 24.
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private actors and governed by market forces simply do not permit the
diversity of perspectives necessary for the flourishing of dialogic democracy. State regulation of speech is thus supported as necessary to promote
free speech. Free speech for those with access to media may limit the
speech of those who lack such access. Access to media must be expanded if we are to secure conditions for effective communication to
promote recognition of diverse interests in the political process and this
may well involve regulation of the exercise of private property-limits to
the rights of shopping mall owners to control access to their properties,
and regulations limiting campaign expenditures, for the most oft-cited
examples." By excluding realms of private law and market forces from
the space he regards as political, the model of democracy Habermas provides would keep existing allocations of communicative power intact
while entrenching corporate dominance over realms of public communication.
Some critical legal scholars go further still, suggesting not only that
a proactive state needs to intervene in private property relations to engender public debate, but that we need to denaturalize the modern public/private distinction that would frame the issue in such terms. According to Allan Hutchinson, for instance, liberal commitments to such dichotomies preclude. the resolution of such dilemmas3 or the realization of
a truly democratic polity,' such that the modem public/private distinction
is politically untenable even as a description:"
As sovereign, the government is as responsible for its active decisions
not to intervene and regulate as it is for its decisions to act affirmatively.... The protection of private property and the enforcement of
private contracts by the government attests to the strong and necessary presence of government in private transactions.... Property and
contract are creatures of the state and support for these allocative regimes is neither more or less politically neutral or activist than opposition to them. The question is not whether government should intervene, but when and how ....
In contemporary American and Canadian jurisprudence, for example, when public speech interests come up against private property interests, the latter almost invariably triumph, ensuring that "the law insulates
vast sectors of the social hierarchy from official scrutiny and public accountability." Those who hold private property are not required to con-

32. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 1417-18; see also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign
Expendituresand Free Speech, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1,11-13 (1998) (discussing the threats
to the public sphere posed by concentration of economic power in the context of campaign expenditures).
33. See Hutchinson, supranote 28, at 20.
34. See id. at 19-20.
35. See id at 21.
36. Id.
37.
d. at 22.
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sider public interests in expression when exercising their property rights.
Once we acknowledge the state's role in creating and enforcing property
rights, however, "the question of whose entitlements are to be protected
from whose interference becomes a contested matter of political choice
rather than the correct application of abstract principle."3'
William Forbath, in a recent critique of Habermas's assumptions
about economic life, makes a similar point. 9 Forbath suggests that
Habermas's view of the economy as a self-regulating system ignores the
insights of Legal Realists and their Critical Legal Studies heirs, who have
repeatedly shown that markets, rather than being self-regulating are in
fact "political artifacts, based on and constituted by highly plastic cultural norms and legal rules." Rather than being uncontested, institutional arrangements, market presuppositions about property rules, ownership entitlements and bargaining norms are far from uncontroversial.
Radical reorganizations of property relations are possible and compatible
with both human autonomy and economic efficiency:
The Neo-Realists... have shown in painstaking detail that far
from being reasonably self-defining, the legal concepts of property
and contract leave open a great variety of possible sets of rights and
ground rules, each with distinctive distributive consequences. One
may believe that markets, as decentralized arenas of exchange and
coordination, are indispensable to freedom and efficiency, and still
one must choose among an indefinitely wide range of alternative sets
of rules and rights, and of alternative arrangements for decentralized
production and exchange. Which of them are most autonomy enhancing, or most conducive to democracy, or most likely to promote
economic growth? ...

[I]nsulating the economic order from demo-

cratic decision making means excluding a world of political choices
from the very processes that Habermas insists should govern such
choices.4
This poses serious social problems for a theory that bases democratic legitimacy in ideal discursive conditions. We would echo Lenoble
when he suggests that
the mere reinforcement of argumentative procedures at the center of
civil society seems to me impotent to counter the effects of the relations of force that structure the socioeconomic field. It is doubtful that
the mere virtues of argumentation in the midst of public space can
counterbalance the perverse effects of the colonization of the life-

38.

Id.
39. See William E. Forbath, Short-Circuit: A Critique of Habermas's Understanding of Law,
Politics, arid Economic Life, in HABERMAS ON LAW, supra note 3, at 272.
40. Id. at 280 (citing the work of Albert Hirschman, Geoffrey Hodgson, Amitai Etzioni, Fred
Block, Charles Sabel, Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy, and Karl Klare).
41. Id. at281.
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world, such as the commercialization of culture and the bureaucratization of important aspects of private life.4
III. OF RATIONALITY AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

Just as preconceptions about "private" interests shape those activities we deem to take place in "public" spheres and thereby limit arenas of
potential political dialogue, determining which expressive activities are
"political" is necessarily a process of social exclusion. The distinction
between political and nonpolitical speech becomes more difficult to defend in situations characterized by growing social inequalities, multiculturalism, transnationalism, and increased sensitivity to sexual and racial
axes of discrimination. Most liberal legal commentators favor the protection of speech that "is both intended and received as a contribution to
public deliberation about some issue. ' Although those who favor speech
rights as necessary incidents to the self-expression of sovereign individuals feel that protection of merely political speech is too restrictive a field
of protection, more consequentialist approaches limit protection to
speech that contributes to public deliberation of political issues. All of
these positions (including Habermas's own) presuppose that the political
can be defined prior to socially signifying activities and as a category for
evaluating them. This predilection, we suggest, may be traced historically to European understandings of civil society and the public sphereboth concepts that have been revitalized in contemporary critical debates
about their continued relevance.
Critics of the bourgeois public sphere idealized in Habermas's early
work suggested that the so-called universal categories of this space of
ideal communication-public and private, speech and property, political
and nonpolitical-were both exclusionary and elitist. To the extent that a
realm designated political is delineated in advance of social activities of
articulation, such parameters will inevitably be perceived from partial
perspectives, privilege particular interests, entrench identities, and limit
identifications. Of particular concern to critical legal scholars is the restriction of political discourse to issues involving the common good, the
foundational distinction between public and private" and the privileging
of rationalist forms of communication. ' Other legal scholars have ad-

42. Lenoble, supra note 4, at 76.
43. THE BILL OF RIGHTs IN THE MODERN STATE, supra note 31, at 304.
44. See generally Howard, supra note 18, for a discussion of the foundational distinction
between public and private, and Forbath, supra note 39, for a more critical analysis of the distinction.
45. For explorations of the forms of rationality presupposed, see Michel Rosenfeld, Can
Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be Reconciled Through Discourse Theory?, in HABERMAS ON LAW,
supra note 3, at 82; Lenoble, supra note 4; Modak-Truran, supra note 3; McCarthy, supra note 18;
William Rehg, Against Subordination, in HABERMAS ON LAW, supra note 3, at 257; Ulrich K.
Preuss, Communicative Power and the Concept of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW, supra note 3,at 323.
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dressed the first of these restrictions,' and we have already considered
the second. The third restriction will be our concern here.
Habermas's concept of rational discourse draws on Kant's idealized
conception of reason as well as Hannah Arendt's work on political
judgment and communicative power. In its most abstracted form, it consists of "an idealized linguistic exchange [between a speaker and a
hearer] in which [the] hearer [makes] a yes or no response to a validity
claim [embodied] in a speech act... uttered by [the] speaker." 7 Can
such a simple exchange provide an adequate building-block for democracy in political communities characterized by the coexistence of multiple and ever-emergent forms of social difference, or does it reflect a form
of cultural bias?
Feminist scholar Iris Marian Young suggests that to restrict the political to deliberation about the common good will have discriminatory
effects whenever existing distributions of symbolic or material goods are
unequal; appeals to a "common good" are likely to perpetuate and reproduce existing privileges to the extent that "particular" experiences and
interests are defined as such from the vantage point of the powerful.'
Political communication, however, necessarily involves encounters with
differences which cannot be "transcended" by appealing to a common
language (which will inevitably be that of the dominant class to the extent that local vernaculars will be deemed idiosyncratic). As political
theorist Nancy Fraser points out, even the process of discursive interaction in formally inclusive arenas puts some people at a disadvantage;
those in subordinate social groups tend to employ styles and idioms of
expression denigrated and marginalized by the mainstream. 9 For Fraser,
this implies the need for a number of distinct public spheres (which
Habermas appears now to agree with) in which deliberations take place
in the context of local lifeworlds. For Young, however, the political itself
must be expanded to encompass more than mere argument. To speak
"across differences of culture, social position, and need"' requires respect for embodied and particular expressive practices such as greeting,
gesture, humor, wordplay, images, figures of speech, seduction, and narrative. In short, Young argues that models of deliberative democracy
ignore or trivialize those very forms of communication through which
differences are expressed.

46. For critical discussions of the concept of the common good in Between Facts and Norms,
see Jacobson, supra note 3; McCarthy, supra note 15; Rosenfeld, supra note 45.
47. Lenoble, supranote 4, at 47.
48. See Iris Marian Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond DeliberativeDemocracy,
in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 120 (Seyla
Benhabib ed., 1996).
49. See Fraser, supra note 19.
50. Young, supra note 48, at 127.
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By restricting his "concept of democratic discussion narrowly to
critical argument" Habermas "assume[s] a culturally biased conception
of discussion that tends to silence or devalue some people or groups. '
Young proposes that a truly "communicative democracy" would respect
other forms of meaning-making activity than those of rational argument,
because the latter contain cultural biases which devalue forms of understanding and expression characteristic of those who are socially marginalized. They may also facilitate gender bias to the extent that women's
use of language may be more "tentative, exploratory, or conciliatory." 2
The speaking styles and rhetorical forms characteristic of sub-cultural
vernaculars may put their expressions of social concern beyond the pale
of what is properly considered political in deliberative democracies. Rap
music and forms of black religious oratory, for example, often (but not
always) convey highly political messages through culturally specific
forms of persuasion, but are unlikely to be acknowledged as political
expression due to their form, regardless of their effects.
Habermas's rationalism cannot encompass the range of expressive
activity that has political meaning and consequence. There is no doubt
that in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas has greatly expanded the
scope of communications that might be considered politically relevant by
multiplying the number of operative public spheres in which opinions,
interests, wills, and identities are forged. Such publics are privileged
precisely because of their intimate relations with meaningful experiences
in the contexts of contingent lifeworlds. Nonetheless, his work still
seems to assume that lifeworld contexts exist in a pristine integrity from
market forces and that "ordinary language" is the authentic vehicle of
their maintenance and reproduction. 3
Public spheres are dominated by the mass media as channels for
communication, community-formation and exerting influence-as
Habermas himself acknowledges. Such media, however, are seen merely
as conduits for communications that are imagined to be autonomous
from market forces.' Habermas does finally acknowledge the literature
on the culture industries that delineates the political economy of media
ownership, program structuring, and financing. Moreover, he gives long
overdue acknowledgment to reception theories and cultural studies that
emphasize the interpretive work that consumers do as audiences in actively refashioning the media texts they receive. Ultimately, however,
this literature is only deployed to nuance Habermas's theory, rather than
serving to subvert or transform it. These interpretive strategies are
viewed as the activity of rational agents whose agencies are in no way
influenced by the texts they consume and whose lifeworlds remain

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 120.
Id. at 123.

Cf.HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 352-64.
Cf.id. at 376-79.
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autonomous from the cultural forms the media affords them. The possibility that market driven means, meanings, texts, and forms of communication may actively shape lifeworld contexts and that media texts might
themselves become part of "ordinary language" is never envisioned. Nor
is the constitutive role of law in these processes alluded to.
IV. OF CULTURAL LIFEWORLDS AND MARKET FORCES

If the protection of public speech can no longer be guaranteed in
contemporary conditions of late capitalist democracies to the extent that
we insist on isolating it from considerations of private property, it has
also become more and more incredible to believe that politics is a sphere
we can isolate from consumer capitalism. One does not need to embrace
a postmodernist philosophy to agree that "the modernist separation of
social spheres, in particular the separation of culture on the one hand
from politics and economics on the other" begs the question of how people endow their lives with the meaning that motivates and legitimates
social action."
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas assumes a less hostile attitude towards mass media than he did in earlier work, but his ambivalence
towards mass mediated cultural forms is still clearly manifest.' Primarily
this ambivalence appears to stem from Habermas's conviction that the
conveyance of information to reach understanding is the privileged, if
not exclusive form of political communication. Whether what is communicated is needs, interests, or issues, and whether wills or opinions are
formed, he assumes that rational communications will fully accomplish
this. The political economy of mass media interests Habermas only to the
extent that it may influence the flow of information between the public
spheres and the political system. To the extent that modem political
spheres are defined by rational debate, "information provision is stressed

55. See Garnham, supranote 24, at 253.
56. As Peter Dews puts it:
He does not conceal the mass of evidence suggesting the extent to which the manipulated, media-saturated public sphere destroys the potential for an effective democratic
opinion to form ....
One could also argue that Habermas's enthusiasm for the "postMarxist" category of "civil society," already tarnished by the latest developments in
Eastern Europe, seriously underplays the continuing role of social class as a factor in determining access to channels of political influence. In Faktizitat and Geltung he is
obliged to appeal, rather weakly, to the "normative self-understanding of the mass media," as informing and facilitating public discussion, in order to convince his readers that
issues of sufficient common concern will eventually obtain a hearing. Even then, however, he stresses that only crises are capable of mobilizing people successfully. Can such
sporadic movements really be said to constitute "communicative practices of self-

determination?"
PETER DEWS, THE LIMrrs OF DISENCHANTMENT: ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN
PHILOSOPHY 199 (1995). For an informative discussion of how we might rethink class relations in
conditions characterized by concentrations of media power and monopolies over information, see
John Carlos Rowe, The Writing Class, in PoLrncs, THEORY, AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 41
(Mark Poster ed. 1993).
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and entertainment is negatively evaluated." 7 Contemporary variants of
critical social theory, however, insist that contemporary identity politics
and new social movements are forged within "the institutions of masscultural dissemination [which] are seen as providing and structuring the
cultural field on which these fragmented and diverse identities are
formed and reformed": 8
[Ain ever-larger proportion of the cultural goods and services
consumed by the world's population are being conceived, produced, and distributed by ...multinational corporations-not
to speak of the consumer goods and their associated advertising
that now play such an important role in the creation and maintenance of cultural identities."
We will not be the first to suggest that the sophistication of current
understandings of textuality has not sufficiently informed contemporary
theories of politics. The conceptual repertoire of such theories seems
remarkably isolated from theoretical insights into the nature of culture
and communication. The transparency of language as a public medium
through which facts and values are communicated is presupposed within
theories of political communication whether these are centered upon
paradigms of individual face-to-face communication or of autonomous
and intentional authors addressing independent reflexive readers.
Critical cultural studies (including anthropology, communications,
sociolinguistics and their legal variants) have shown that human beings
always speak with and within historically specific modes of representation. The lifeworld resources available for communicative activity shape
our ways of knowing even as we use them to express identity and aspiration. We create social realities discursively and through systems of signification we transform in the process. Discursive social interactions and
the opportunities for imaginative meaning making they yield are paramount to human life and crucial to historical change. In too much of
contemporary political theory, however, highly mediated symbolic forms
are treated as the unproblematic expressions of singular authors and as
unmeditated reflections of external realities that pre-exist (and are uninfluenced by) their circulation.' Processes of information production, distribution, and consumption, however, play an ever greater role in contemporary social and cultural theories; mass media is recognized as central, not only in terms of the forms and channels of communication, but
also in terms of providing the media we communicate with. Is it sensible
to continue to maintain a Romantic opposition between culture as an

57.
58.

Garnham, supra note 24, at 253.
Id.

59.

Id. at 256.

60.

Id. at 261.
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authentic lifeworld and capitalist market relations as rational systems
which alienate us from human meanings?
Habermas, like many contemporary constitutional theorists, clearly
recognizes the dangers of corporate control and concentration of ownership, and the effects of free market principles in limiting the cultural resources, information, and modes of argumentation available to us in a
consumer society. Contemporary social theory, however, suggests that
mass mediation is far more extensive as a force shaping communications.
As Nicholas Garnham puts it, what political theory still fails to grasp is
"that' 'what has also come to be mediated is the content of communication" itself.
Our everyday social relations, our social identities are
constructed in complex processes ... of [media] mediations.
We see ourselves.., in terms of ways of seeing those identities
constructed in and through mediated communications...and we
often express [these] using objects of consumption provided
and in large part determined by the system of economic production and exchange. '
This is not, however, simply to equate media with culture. Such an
equation reifies and freezes culture and elides the very social practices
through which meanings are generated and transformed.63 Lifeworlds are
produced through the construction and contestation of meaning. The
reactivation of media-activated textuality is central to cultural reproduction and to social transformation. The political work that such practices
of interpreting commodified textuality achieve cannot be reduced to information transfer in the service of rational discourse. Use of media to
make meaning is often a constitutive and transformative activity, not
merely a referential or descriptive one.
Individual identities and cultural communities are dialectically created and related through signifying activities that must deploy socially
available vehicles of significance. Increasingly, the most widely accessible cultural forms are those conveyed by and appropriated from mass
media channels of communications. Indeed, access to media signifiers
might well be deemed a prerequisite to the proliferation of alternative
understandings in the public sphere. Law, however, intervenes powerfully to prevent such possibilities.

61. Id. at260.
62. Id. at 260-61.
63. See Dana Polan, The Public's Fear: or, Media As Monster in Habermas, Negt, and Kluge,
in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 33, 35 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).
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V. OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: PRIVATE PROPERTIES AND PUBLIC
SPEECH

The imagery of commerce and the commodification of imagery
provides a rich semiotic source for expressive activity in contemporary
public spheres. In consumer cultures, however, most pictures, texts, motifs, labels, logos, trade names, designs, tunes, and even some colors and
scents are governed, if not controlled, by regimes of intellectual property.
As Coombe has explored in great detail elsewhere, intellectual property
laws (copyright, trademark, publicity rights, design patents, merchandising rights and some consumer protection laws) create private property
rights in cultural forms or lifeworld resources and thereby insinuate
commodity relations into most forms of lifeworld communications.'
Film theorist Miriam Hansen suggests that contemporary public
spheres cannot be legitimated by appeal to the liberal-bourgeois model,
because they can "no longer pretend to a separate sphere above the marketplace." Corporate public relations have an increasing presence and
influence in public domains and spaces of leisure, entertainment, and
consumption are colonized by "the privately owned media of the consciousness industry." Nonetheless, as Coombe has argued, by virtue of
the legal bestowal of intellectual property rights, corporate producers of
those cultural forms gain all of the powers and privileges of bourgeois
authors with none of the social responsibilities and public accountability
historically invested in that political figure. '7
In the modem public sphere, an "unrestricted rational discussion of
public matters that is open and accessible to all in the service of producing consensus about the common good" was both anticipated and encouraged. The proliferation and increased circulation of print media facilitated the creation of a critical "public." The modern figure of the
author emerges concomitantly with this print-mediated public; the very
act of publishing implies an appeal to reason, that is, to the reflexive capacities of a readership engaged in relationship to a print-based public
sphere. This unitary author who speaks with a single voice and possesses
a singular self embodied in unique textual expressions deemed to be his
"works," and thus his property, ' is the conceptual foundation of copy-

64. See COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTIES, supra note 5.

65.

Miriam Hansen, Unstable Mixtures DilatedSpheres: Negt and Kluge 's The Public Sphere

and Experience, Twenty Years Later,5 PUBLIC CULTURE 200 (1993).

66.

Id.

67. See COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LiFE OF IrELLECjUAL PROPERTIES, supra note 5.

68. Id.
69. See Rosemary J.Coombe, Contesting Paternity: Histories of Copyright, 6 YALE J.L&
HUMAN. 397, 398-99 (1994) (exploring the historical emergence and consolidation of these ideas in
England and Germany in a review of historical literature on copyright).
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right, later extended by implication to trademarks, design patents and
rights of publicity."0
As modes of technology for the transmission of cultural products
have proliferated, the author-function has been stretched to accommodate
them. Rather than outline a history, an example will suffice. The originating role in cultural reproduction has increasingly become centralized
in corporate entities due to the complexities of the divisions of labor and
the scale of capital involved in creating new media works for new technologies of dissemination." Legally, however, the bourgeois authorfunction maintains its hegemony. Drawing upon Edelman's pioneering
work, sociologist Celia Lury points to the relocation of authorship with
respect to cinematographic works. A film is clearly the product of highly
differentiated labor and of a multiplicity of creative processes not easily
accommodated by the legal fictions of individuated creation, singular
personality and juridical subjecthood that copyright law crystallizes in
the figure of the author as first owner of copyright. By vesting legal
rights of authorship "in the collective subject constituted by the representatives of the capital used to produce the film,"'" the attributes of the
creative author are extended to capital itself; "the 'original' moment here
is thus that of investment. By contrast, the 'creative' labour of others
involved in the process of film production is proletarianised in order to
deprive them of such a right."
Romantic ideologies of authorship justify both copyright protections
and the commodification of publicly circulating cultural texts as the 'private' properties of corporate individuals. Modernity's legitimating rhetoric-historically based upon democratic dialogical ideals-now serves to
protect corporate hegemony over increasingly monologic domains of
mass culture.' Fictions of creativity, personality, and originality are preserved to legitimate the rights of investors to control the commerce in
and circulation of corporately-produced textuality, and to police its reworkings by others.
Today's spaces of civil society, public spheres, and emergent counterpublics are fundamentally different from those of the bourgeois public
70.

For an overview of some of the developing literature on the history of literary property in

the eighteenth century, see id and the sources cited therein. For an excellent collection of essays on
historical and contemporary dimensions of authorship and copyright, see THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION INLAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter
Jaszi eds., 1994).
71. Cf. CELIA Luty, CULTURAL RIGHTs: TECHNOLOGY, LEGALrrY AND PERSONALrrY 34-35

(1993).
72.
73.
74.
function
tions of
States).

id. at 35.
Id.
See generally THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR (1996) (showing how the authorwas continually extended to maintain the fiction of individual authors and readers in reladirect contractual exchange in the development of television broadcasting in the United
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sphere whose demise Habermas has famously lamented. Nonetheless,
intellectual property laws still privilege the figure of the author, using
conceptual premises that presuppose the continuance of eighteenthcentury European conditions. Today's authors--corporate holders of
intellectual property rights in the promotional texts proffered by mass
media-have all of the exclusive rights and privileges of the bourgeois
author and none of his traditional responsibilities or forms of accountability. Corporate authors cannot be held accountable in any direct way
for the advertising messages they convey in unidirectional forms of illocutionary address because they so seldom assume the form of rational
argumentation and provide no space for response. They are, however,
responded to in lifeworld activities of appropriation, but these are always
at risk of being censored as forms of intellectual property infringement.
Public dialogue about the greater good--once encouraged by the activities of publicly responsible authors-is no longer even considered a goal
that might be accomplished through the legal recognition of authorship
via intellectual property laws. Instead, the law increasingly serves to ensure that returns on capital investment in forms of commercial speech are
secured, but at the price of creating monologic lifeworld conditions
through unidirectional forms of illocutionary address. New communications technologies pose new opportunities for more democratic forms of
dialogue, but even these discursive spaces (like the Internet) have become warzones between those who would seek to use intellectual property rights to censor expressive speech which "speaks back" to corporate
power and those who attempt to use this space to subject mass media
cultural texts to social circulation, shared deliberation, lifeworld commentary, critique, satire, and parody. Alternative public spheres are vulnerable to the very legal power that should, on Habermas's account,
transmit their expressions to the core of administrative powers. Understanding how the law at once constitutes and threatens alternative public
spheres undermines any simple sense of bifunctional duality.
Legal frameworks enable the reproduction and repetition of cultural
forms as ever the same marks of authorial proprietorship, while paradoxically prohibiting and inviting their interpretive appropriation in the
service of other interests and alternative agendas. Such legal regimes are
constitutive in shaping commercial and popular culture, both in terms of
the cultural power that the law affords holders of copyright, trademark,
and publicity rights, but also by creating the incentives for the mass dissemination of symbolic forms which ensures their ubiquity in daily life.
Scholars in literary theory, communications, film studies, and political
theory point to the social importance of media-circulated cultural forms
and their political significance in contemporary consumer societies.
These signifying vehicles assume local meanings in the lifeworlds of
those who incorporate them into quotidian practices, emergent identities,
and nascent communities. They may also provide rhetorical means with
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which to articulate appeals for political recognition, corporate accountability, and social transformation.7'
We might point to one central paradox of postmodernity: just as all
forms of cultural difference are appropriated by corporate interests in the
authorship of new commodity forms that circulate publicly through
mass-media communications, the proliferation of publicly-disseminated
commodity signs simultaneously enriches the realm of cultural resources
with which counterpublics may be forged.76 Such alternative public
spheres, however, remain vulnerable to the legal power that authorship
confers upon commercial-industrial forces of publicity. Corporate cultural power is maintained and insulated from public scrutiny by legal
liberalism's distinctions between public and private, property and speech,
fact and fiction, and commercial and noncommercial forms of expression. The deployment of such distinctions in intellectual property regimes serves to privilege the appropriations, decontextualizations and
commodification of lifeworlds by capitalist interests as acts of authorship, while it simultaneously delegitimates those creative reappropriations around which counterpublics form as acts of illicit piracy. Although
corporate appropriation of cultural forms and the appropriation of mass
media texts in the lifeworld activities of others can never be fully contained, the dialectical relationship between legally created forms of
power and legally investigated forms of resistance clearly alerts us to the
difficulty, if not the futility of sustaining any vision of pristine lifeworlds
isolated from market systems or of law as a neutral mediating force between them. Today's spaces of civil society, public spheres and counterpublics are fundamentally different from those of the bourgeois public
sphere that Habermas holds in such high regard.
Postliberal and postliterary public formations thus pose different
questions for democracy and demand different political responses. The
modern ideal of intentional authors appealing to the rational deliberation
of readers, or the idealized linguistic exchange in which a hearer arrives
at a yes or no response to a validity-claim in a speech act that has been
uttered by a speaker," are inadequate formulations for communication in
a promotional culture'-such as our image and logo-saturated worldwhere corporately-authored messages, flashing images and rapid soundbites are dominant signifying modes. Messages conveyed by quickly
circulating evanescent signifiers on a multitude of shifting surfaces can75. For longer discussions and numerous examples, see Rosemary J. Coombe, Sports Trademarks and Somatic Politics,in SPORTCULT 262 (T.Miller & R. Martin eds., 1999).
76. See Hansen, supra note 65.
77. See Lenoble, supra note 4,at 47.
78. See generally ANDREW WERNICK, PROMOTIONAL CULTURE: ADVERTISING, IDEOLOGY,
AND SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION (1991); Andrew Wernick, Promotional Culture, 15 CAN. J. POL. &
Soc. THEORY 260 (1991). Wemick says that North American culture has come to present itself at
every level as an endless series of promotional messages; advertising, besides having become a most
powerful institution in its own right, has been effectively universalized as a signifying mode.
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not be effectively countered with oral arguments or written treatises.
Indeed, it may be impossible even to say "no" in any fashion that is persuasive or audible when responding to commercial culture that does not
deploy mass media forms and tactics and use the private properties of
others to refuse their connotations.
In short, the commodification of cultural forms creates new relations of power in contemporary cultural politics-arenas for connotative
struggle.' If we recognize cultural signifiers as multivocal sites of conflict bearing the traces of social struggles and historically inscribed differences, then laws which govern the circulation of these forms--controlling their ironic reproductions and parodic recodings-necessarily
intervene in processes of defining the social and its parameters by enabling and legitimating practices of cultural authority that attempt to contain the expression of difference in the public sphere.
In The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties,Coombe shows that
intellectual property law does not function simply in a rule-like fashion,
nor is it adequately portrayed as a regime of rights and obligations.' Although it is constructed through a rhetoric of private property rights and
public benefits, it is necessary to go beyond its self-representation to
show how it is also simultaneously a generative condition and a prohibitive boundary for practices of political expression, public sphere formation, and counterpublic articulations of political aspiration. This is not
immediately apparent, however, if one limits one's scholarly gaze to
constitutions and statutes, human rights covenants and reported cases.
From the perspective of a critical cultural legal studies, the (social) life of
the law cannot be explored simply in terms of its logos, positivities, or
presences. It must be seen, as well, in terms of "counterfactuals,"8 ' the
missing, the hidden, the repressed, the silenced, the misrecognized, and
the traces of practices and persons underrepresented or unacknowledged
in its legitimations. The law's impact may be felt where it is least evident
and where those affected may have few resources to recognize or pursue
their rights in institutional forums. The law is at work shaping social
worlds of meaning-not only when it is institutionally encountered, but
when it is consciously and unconsciously apprehended. Its power is at
work when threats of legal action are made as well as when they are actually acted upon. People's imagination of what "the law says" shapes
lifeworld evaluations and value commitments as well as the expressive
forms chosen to assert claims for collective recognition. People's anticipations of law (however reasonable, ill-informed, mythical, or even
paranoid) may actually shape law and the property rights it protects. The
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law is a palpable presence when people create their own alternative standards and sanctions governing the use of corporate properties in the
moral economies that emerge in law's shadows.
VI. CONCLUSION

"We surely must address the legitimacy of the law in relation to the
rights of democratic participation that underpin the 'ethics of communication' in political and legal fields."82 We cannot do so, however, if we
begin from a position that cordons off laws governing private property,
communications markets, and commercial speech from critical scrutiny
and democratic accountability. We cannot expect the law to protect
"fundamental individual rights" as conditions of the participatory structure of public communication if we fail to recognize the political implications of the fact that law, by protecting the interests of corporations as
individual rights holders in the public sphere, also guarantees forms of
corporate communicative hegemony.
Theorists of dialogue and democracy in contemporary conditions
must address the role of the market in shaping means and forms of communications in civil society. George Yudice and Bruce Robbins argue
that the concept of civil society will only continue to have critical purchase if it is capable of engaging the "global conjunctures of culture and
capitalism" as well as the practices through which publics and counterpublics "maintain significant and even adversarial autonomy within, and
even perhaps, by means of the market."8 They plead for recognition of a
more "creative politics of citizenship"' and a greater creativity in conceiving the political such that it can at least potentially encompass a
greater range of "social sites of production and reproduction" that will
include spheres of commerce and consumption." In a world where the
media through which views are disseminated are centralized, corporately
owned, and operated for profit, subaltern social groups are both culturally disenfranchised and materially deprived of means to public participation. As media theorist Miriam Hansen suggests, "the media of industrial-commercial publicity is an inescapable horizon, and the most advanced site of struggle over the organization of everyday experience."'
Democratic dialogue will require more than equal access to the forums and channels of communication-the material conditions for conversation. It will require consideration of appropriate access to the symbolic means of communication-the cultural conditions for conversation.
If the most powerful signifiers and those most widely disseminated are
the private properties of an elite-if their meanings are controlled and
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Lenoble, supranote 4, at 61.
THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 19, at 112.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Hansen, supra note 65, at 211.
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their polysemy exclusively possessed-then it becomes impossible to
engage in dialogic interaction with and within the historical lifeworld in
which we are situated. The social systems of signification through which
a dialogic democracy constitutes itself must be available, not merely to
convey information-an unduly reductivist understanding of human
communication-but to express identity, community, and social aspiration in the service of imagining and constructing alternative social universes. Regardless of those who assert them, such dialogic practices may
be of larger social benefit, for they provide conversational means for new
allegiances and affiliations-the basis for recognizing the other in one's
self and one's identification with others. Dialogic practices must be public and widely visible to serve these purposes; this is only possible when
they can be mass-disseminated. In a market economy, this will necessarily involve mass reproduction and distribution processes linked to the
commerce that increasingly constitutes relations of communication. No
pristine space of noncommercial dialogic exchange need be insisted
upon, nor is it appropriate to privilege particular discursive sites, cultural
mediums, or signifying vehicles as defining the limits of the properly
political.
It may well be imperative, then, not to isolate a sphere of political
activity when assessing the effects and affect of expressive activity. In
David Carroll's terms, "the so-called postindustrial, postmodern, hyperreal age of information in which we supposedly live"8 demands the articulation of a critical sense of the political formulated without Enlightenment certainties about the boundaries of public and private, culture and
politics, commerce and art.' What makes a contemporary political community common cannot assume the form of an identity or image of collectivity but must remain indeterminate." An undetermined notion of
community is necessary to animate a postmodern public and to enable
the full range of activities we might recognize as political:
The critical demand we make of the political should also
challenge what is accepted or acceptable as "practical politics"
by constantly making possible other forms of political practice
than those practised as politics."
Conditions of postmodernity have opened up new possibilities for political activity that were foreclosed by modernity's metanarratives and their
pretences to universality. Challenges to the boundaries of the public
sphere from those formerly excluded from making public claims, for
example, creates a potentially far greater realm of and for political activity.
87.
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As Lenoble puts it, "liberal legal formalism, no less than the instrumentalization of law that accompanies the welfare state, remains bound
to the metaphysical assumption that a society is able to grasp itself."9' If
we recognize, instead, that the social world must be represented, performatively expressed, and institutionally inscribed, we are compelled to
abandon a metaphysics of political presence that presupposes a realm of
self-evidently "political" practices. This is not to suggest that society is
meaningless, but that its meaning is never fully transparent to us.
Habermas cannot grasp the communicative nature of the pluralism that
distinguishes contemporary democracies to the extent that his formal
understanding of language and his conception of speech acts is still
grounded in "a classical model of a unique validity and of the objective
world as a stable system."' Today, democratic pluralism is, as Lenoble
notes, predicated upon an unstable constellation of incommensurable
systems of meaning, given the very "pragmatic undecidability of all linguistic communication."' 3 The declining faith in objectivism and positivism enables us to acknowledge the contingent character of those articulations which gave full meaning to Enlightenment concepts and to the
categories of modern politics.' The parameters of the public sphere as a
space of deliberation and recognition are only ever contingently forged.
Moreover, they are continuously challenged by the expressive activities
of others who may be deigned without standing in political arenas, making appeals with respect to issues first understood to be the private concerns of those who occupy particularistic spaces. Contemporary public
spheres must continually incorporate new social developments that press
political boundaries. These include both the contestations of those whose
specificities had previously excluded them from the bourgeois public
sphere (those whose particular needs were rendered private issues) as
well as the transformation of relations of representation and reception in
a world of globalized media communications. 5 The result of such an
engagement is a more inclusive understanding of the political that extends beyond -the influence of state policy to potentially include all sites
of cultural production and reproduction in which relations of social difference, entitlement, recognition, and redistribution are established and
contested in conditions involving publicity.
91. Lenoble, supra note 4, at 75.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. at 61.
94. See THE MAKING OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES 1-8 (Ernesto Laclau ed., 1994). For similar
arguments, see ARYEH BOTWINICK, POSTMODERNISM AND DEMOCRATIC Theory (1993), and
CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRATIC AND POLIICAL THEORY 17-19 (David Macy trans., 1988), arguing
that:
Democracy is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of the markers of certainty. It inaugurates a history in which people experience a fundamental indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law and knowledge, and as to the basis of relations between self and other,
at every level of social life.
LEFORT, supra, at 19.
95. See Hansen, supra note 65.
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For a critical cultural studies of law, this recognition entails attention to the structural limits or institutional obstacles to the meaningmaking capacities of ever-emergent others. Rather than insisting on a
pristine space of noncommercial dialogic exchange, or predefining the
political according to particular modes of discourse, legal scholars ought
to monitor the way in which market agents-and, no less, legal regimes--effect partial fixations of social meanings and contain the articulatory agencies of others. Otherwise, law may well silence those
groups who most need its assistance in speaking difference to power.

